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BOARD OF TRUSTEES V. CITY OF BALTIMORE: PUBLIC
PENSION FUND DIVESTMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN
SECURITIES UPHELD
INTRODUCTION
In Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System of Baltimore v.
Mayor of Baltimore,' the Court of Appeals upheld Baltimore City Or-
dinance No. 765 (the Ordinance),2 which decreed that none of Balti-
more City's three employee pension plan funds could remain
invested in companies doing business "in or with" South Africa, or
in banks that make loans to South Africa.3 The Baltimore City
Council passed the Ordinance, with the Mayor's approval, in the
wake of nationwide political pressure during the last years of the
Reagan administration 4 to enact sanctions disapproving South Af-
rica's apartheid system. Since the enactment of the Ordinance and
many other state and local measures, however, the courts have
neither upheld nor struck down any regulation similar to Balti-
more's Ordinance. As such, the Court of Appeals' decision breaks
new ground.
Although the Board of Trustees of each pension plan (the
Trustees) challenged the Ordinance on numerous constitutional
grounds, a unanimous court upheld it.5 In so doing, the court re-
jected six constitutional lines of attack on the Ordinance, which al-
l. 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1167 (1990).
2. BALTIMORE Crry, MD., CODE art. 22 §§ (7)(a)(13), (35)(a)(13) (Supp. 1989). With
the passage of Ordinance No. 792, the City Council also affirmatively resolved the ques-
tion of whether Ordinance No. 765 applied to one of the three pension funds that did
not appear in the text of Ordinance No. 765. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 82, 562 A.2d
at 724. Any reference to "the Ordinance" hereinafter incorporates Ordinance No. 792
as well as Ordinance No. 765. See infra notes 12 & 16.
3. 317 Md. at 80-81, 562 A.2d at 724.
4. See Crocker, South Africa: Eight Years Later, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1989, at 146, 147.
The Reagan administration's policy of "constructive engagement" was an "activist strat-
egy of regional engagement" that by definition rejected divestment as an effective policy
for promoting the reform of the apartheid system. Although this policy escaped mass
criticism during Reagan's first term, it succumbed to public opinion during Reagan's
final 30 months in office as evidenced by Congress' imposition of sanctions through the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151, 2346d, 5001-5116
(Supp. V 1987). By September 1986, 19 states and 62 cities and counties had enacted
anti-apartheid measures that mandated some form of divestment. Lewis, Dealing with
South Africa: the Constitutionality of State and Local Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REv.
469, 471-72 (1987).
5. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 148, 562 A.2d at 757.
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leged that: (1) it impermissibly delegated legislative authority to a
private entity, the Africa Fund, which compiles a list of companies
that do business in or with South Africa, (2) it impaired Baltimore
City's (the City) pension contracts with its employees, (3) it consti-
tuted an unconstitutional taking, (4) it was pre-empted by congres-
sional sanctions against South Africa, (5) it infringed upon the
federal government's power to make foreign policy, and (6) it vio-
lated the commerce clause.6
This Note first outlines the Court of Appeals' response to each
of these challenges. 7 It then discusses two problems with the court's
decision. First, the Note argues that with respect to the delegation
challenge and the court's interpretation of the Ordinance as provid-
ing a nonbinding reference list, the court should have inquired as to
whether or not as a matter of fact the Trustees behaved as though
they were bound by the list.' Second, the Note addresses the
court's finding that the Ordinance had only minimal and indirect
impact on South Africa, and therefore did not impinge upon the
federal government's primacy in foreign affairs.9 In so finding, the
court ignored that the Baltimore City Council passed the divestment
legislation as part of a pervasive national movement intended to im-
pact substantially on South Africa's internal affairs. The Note next
focuses on one commentator's suggestion that because the Ordi-
nance is a form of community speech, the first amendment may be
raised in its defense.'0 The Note concludes with the argument that
Baltimore City might have avoided the most serious challenges to
the Ordinance by permitting employees to opt out of the divestment
program.11
I. FACTS
At the time of the Ordinance's enactment, the City maintained
three employee pension plans, 12 each administered by a board of
trustees.' 3 When the parties commenced the suit, the three plans
6. Id. at 83, 562 A.2d at 725.
7. See infra notes 26-96 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 97-66 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 107-139 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 140-173 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 174-176 and accompanying text.
12. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. 72, 79, 562 A.2d 720, 723 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1167 (1990). These pension plans were the Elected Officials Retirement System, the
Fire and Police Employees Retirement System, and the Employees Retirement System.
Id.
13. Id.
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controlled a total sum of $1.2 billion.' 4 The beneficiaries under
each of the plans were entitled both to defined future benefits and
to variable benefits. 5
On July 3, 1986, the Mayor of Baltimore signed Ordinance No.
765, as passed by the City Council.' 6 The Ordinance provides that
no pension funds shall remain in or be invested in banks or financial
institutions which make loans to South Africa or in companies which
transact business in or with South Africa.' 7 The Ordinance states
that business entities doing business in or with South Africa "shall
be identified by reference to the most recent annual report of the
Africa Fund entitled 'Unified List of United States Companies with
Investments or Loans in South Africa and Namibia.' "18 The Ordi-
nance requires that divestiture occur within a two-year period, com-
mencing on the first day of the third quarter of fiscal 1987.'9 The
Board of Trustees, however, is empowered to suspend divestiture
efforts2" if it finds them injurious to the fund."' In adopting the
resolution, the trustees must set forth in writing the standards, con-
clusions, and duration of the suspension. Each suspension period
may last no longer than ninety days, and the time period for divesti-
ture is tolled during the suspension.23
14. Id. at 79-80, 562 A.2d at 723. The plans had invested 40 to 50% of these funds
in equities or common stock, and fixed income instruments, respectively, or in cash and
short-term equivalents. Id. at 80, 562 A.2d at 723.
15. Id. at 80, 562 A.2d at 723. The variable benefits depend directly on the fund's
rate of return, and accrue only when the annual rate of return exceeds 7.5%. Id.
16. BALTIMORE CrrY, MD., CODE art. 22, §§ (7)(a)(13), (35)(a)(13) (Supp. 1987);
Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 80, 562 A.2d at 724. By its terms, this Ordinance applied
only to the Employees Retirement System and the Fire and Police Employees Retire-
ment System. Id. at 82, 562 A.2d at 724. Later, the Baltimore City Council enacted
Ordinance No. 792 to provide expressly that the Elected Officials Retirement Fund was
subject to the City's divestiture initiatives. Id.; see supra note 2.
17. BALnMORE Crrm, MD., CODE art. 22, §§ (7)(a)(13)(i), (35)(a)(13)(i) (Supp. 1987).
18. Id. §§ (7)(a)(13)(ii), (35)(a)(13)(ii).
19. Id. §§ (7)(a)(13) n.l, §§ 2(b), 3, (35)(a)(13) n.1, §§ 2(b), 3.
20. Id. §§ (7)(a)(13) n.l, § 2(d), (35)(a)(13) n.l, § 2(d).
21. Id. §§ (7)(a)(13) n.1, § 2(e), (35)(a)(13) n.1, § 2(e). Before adopting a resolution
that suspends divestiture, the Board of Trustees must find:
(1) That the rate of return on the funds [is] substantially lower than the
average of the annual earnings on the funds over the past five years, and
(2) That continued divestiture under this Ordinance will be inconsistent
with generally accepted investment standards for conservators of pension funds
notwithstanding the intent of this ordinance, or
(3) That divestiture under the divestiture ordinance will cause financial
losses to the funds.
Id.
22. Id. §§ (7)(a)(13) n.1, § 2(0, (35)(a)(13) n.1, § 2(o.
23. Id. The court noted that as of November 1987, the two-year period for divesti-
1032 [VOL. 49:1030
1990] BOARD OF TRUSTEES V. CITY OF BALTIMORE 1033
On December 31, 1986, the Trustees filed suit in the Baltimore
City Circuit Court seeking a declaration that the Ordinance was in-
valid.24 After a three-week trial, the trial court upheld the validity of
the Ordinance. 25 The Trustees appealed this ruling.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING
A. Impermissible Delegation of Legislative Power
On appeal, the Trustees first challenged the Ordinance on the
ground that it impermissibly delegated legislative power to a private
entity by its provision that the Africa Fund's annual Unified List of
United States Companies with Investments or Loans in South Africa and
Namibia (the Unified List), should be used exclusively to target com-
panies for divestment.26 The court agreed with the Trustees that
such a delegation would violate Article XI-A of the Maryland Con-
stitution if the Africa Fund's conclusions actually bound the Trust-
ees;27 the "Baltimore City Council has the sole power to enact local
legislation for the people of Baltimore City."' 28 The court, however,
then relied on the principle that courts whenever possible must con-
strue statutes so that they are constitutional,29 and agreed with the
circuit court that the Ordinance's use of the word "reference" was
ture had not begun to run yet for the Fire and Police Employees Retirement Plan and
the Employees Retirement System and that the Trustees had adopted successive resolu-
tions, finding that the "'rate of return on the funds [has been] substantially lower than
the average of the annual earnings on the funds over the past five years.'" Board of
Trustees, 317 Md. 72, 82, 562 A.2d 720, 725 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1167 (1990).
24. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 82-83, 562 A.2d at 725.
25. Id. at 87-88, 562 A.2d at 727. The trial court also considered and rejected a
motion by four pension fund beneficiaries to intervene in the litigation. Id. at 83, 562
A.2d at 725. The Court of Appeals, however, found that the beneficiaries had such a
right of intervention under Maryland Rule 2-214, because the Trustees' had similar, but
not identical, interests to those of the beneficiaries. id. at 91, 562 A.2d at 729. The
court was particularly concerned about the possibility that a decision by the City not to
allow the Trustees to appeal a loss to the Supreme Court would deny the beneficiaries
adequate representation. Id. Baltimore Mayor Kurt L. Schmoke indicated to the press
that he would oppose such an appeal. Robinson, Court Backs Pension Fund Divestment, The
Sun (Baltimore), Sept. 6, 1989, at D5, col. 2. Ultimately, the Mayor appears to have kept
his promise since only the intervenors petitioned for certiorari. Lubman v. Baltimore City,
110 S. Ct. 1167 (1990) (certiorari denied).
26. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 92, 562 A.2d at 730; see R. KNIGHT & R. WALKE,
UNIFIED LIST OF UNITED STATES COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND
NAmIBiA (2d ed. 1988).
27. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 92-93, 562 A.2d at 730. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 3
provides for the creation of local legislative bodies and describes their functions.
28. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 93, 562 A.2d at 730.
29. Id. at 97, 562 A.2d at 732 (citing Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 566, 560 A.2d
1120, 1127 (1989); Yangming Transp. v. Revon Prods., 311 Md. 496, 509, 536 A.2d
633, 640 (1988)).
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reasonably subject to the construction that the Unified List did not
bind the Trustees."°
B. Contracts Clause Challenge
The court next turned to the Trustees' contention that the Or-
dinance impaired in three ways the obligations of the beneficiaries'
pension funds in violation of the contracts clause of the federal Con-
stitution."' First, the Trustees argued not that divestiture would im-
pair retirees' benefits, 2 but that the Ordinance indirectly changed
the pension contracts by altering the way the plans invested the
funds.33 The court agreed with the trial court's finding that of the
two types of benefits-defined benefits and variable benefits 34-
which the pension funds provided, divestment would alter only the
variable benefits.3 5 Moreover, because the circuit court found to be
minimal both the initial and ongoing costs of divestiture,3 6 the
Court of Appeals determined that the impairment to variable bene-
fits was not unconstitutional.3 7
Second, the court rejected the Trustees' argument that divest-
ment unconstitutionally impaired the plan's obligation to the benefi-
ciaries by changing the Trustees' common-law fiduciary duties of
prudence and loyalty. 38 The Trustees argued that the Ordinance
increased risk and reduced income by excluding.a significant seg-
ment of the investment universe.3 9 But the court was unconcerned
that the Ordinance would inhibit the Trustees from pursuing an
30. Id. at 98, 562 A.2d at 732.
31. Id. at 99, 562 A.2d at 733.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 100, 562 A.2d at 734.
34. See supra note 15.
35. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 101, 562 A.2d at 734.
36. Id. The circuit court found that the initial cost of divestiture would be .32% of
the pension systems' assets and that the ongoing annual cost would be .20%. Id. For
two studies that discuss the financial impact of divestment on portfolios, see Grossman
& Sharpe, Financial Implications of South African Divestment, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug.
1986, at 15; Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), South Africa Review Ser-
vice, The Impact of South Africa-Related Divestment on Equity Portfolio Performance (Jan. 1985)
(reviewing nine other studies); see also Jerry & Joy, Social Investing and the Lessons of South
Africa Divestment: Rethinking the Limitations on Fiduciary Discretion, 66 OR. L. REv. 685
(1987). Ij
37. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 101, 562 A.2d at 734.
38. Id. at 102, 562 A.2d at 734.
39. Id. at 104, 562 A.2d at 735. The court noted that the Ordinance did place some
constraints on investment possibilities. Id. at 103, 562 A.2d at 735. For example, the
Trustees argued that the Africa Fund's Unified List banned investment in nearly one-half
of the companies listed on the Standard & Poor 500. The court, however, reasoned that
viable investment alternatives were available. Id. at 103-04, 562 A.2d at 735.
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"active" style of investment management-the beneficiaries con-
tractually were not entitled to "a particular management style," nor
would "passive" portfolio management necessarily fail to duplicate
the returns that more active management could earn.40 In addition,
certain provisions in the Ordinance allowed the Trustees to mitigate
any harm brought about by divestiture.4 '
Finally, the court rejected the Trustees' contention that the Or-
dinance impermissibly alters fiduciary duties by requiring the con-
sideration of social factors "unrelated to investment
performance."42 To the contrary, the court reasoned, the Trustees
may "properly consider the social performance of the corpora-
tion[s]," in which they invest.43 Indeed, when the impairment to
benefits that resulted from factoring social consequences into the
investment decision is de minimis, neither the Trustees' prudence
nor loyalty could be called into question.44
C. Takings Clause Challenge
The court next rejected the intervening beneficiaries' 45 argu-
ment that the Ordinance, by reducing the variable benefits that the
beneficiaries would receive, constituted a governmental confiscation
of property without compensation in violation of due process.46 Af-
ter determining that a property interest existed under Maryland
law,47 the court applied the three-part takings test set forth in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.48 It concluded that: (1)
the Ordinance's economic impact was not constitutionally signifi-
40. Id. at 104-05, 562 A.2d at 735-36. But see Grossman & Sharpe, supra note 36, at
15 (discussing effects on risk and expected return associated with divestment). The au-
thors conclude that although constraints on an investor's decision-making never can im-
prove his or her financial situation,
[oin the other hand, some institutional investment portfolios appear to be
suboptimal (at least after the fact). It may well be that substitution of an effi-
cient, passive [South Africa Free] strategy for an inefficient active strategy may
lead to an overall improvement, although a smaller one than might have been
obtained with an efficient unconstrained strategy.
Id. at 27.
41. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 105, 562 A.2d at 736; see supra notes 20-23 and ac-
companying text.
42. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 105, 562 A.2d at 736.
43. Id. at 106, 562 A.2d at 736 (quoting 3 ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 227.17 (W. Fratcher
4th ed. 1988)).
44. Id at 109-10, 562 A.2d at 738.
45. See supra note 25 (discussing the beneficiaries' right to intervene).
46. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 110-11, 562 A.2d at 738-39.
47. Id. at 111, 562 A.2d at 739.
48. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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cant, (2) the Ordinance did not interfere with "distinct investment-
backed expectations," and (3) the character of the governmental ac-
tion was innocuous. 49
D. Federal Sanctions Did Not Pre-empt Local Divestment
Turning to the argument that the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986 (the Act)5 0 pre-empts the Ordinance, the
court noted as a general matter that regulations passed in the tradi-
tional sphere of local authority "enjoy a strong presumption that
they are not preempted."'" Nevertheless, and even in the absence
of explicit pre-emptive language in the Act,52 the court reviewed the
Act's legislative history for evidence of an implicit congressional in-
tent to pre-empt local laws.53 After a careful review, the court found
ample evidence that Congress had no such intent when it passed the
Act.54
The court also rejected the argument that an actual conflict ex-
isted between the two laws.5 5 The court reasoned that the Ordi-
nance did not conflict with the Act's "carrot and stick" approach to
South Africa because the Ordinance focused on "the conduct of
businesses in which the City has investments," rather than on the
conduct of the South African Government. 56 Further, the court was
persuaded that the Act neither required nor affirmatively en-
couraged American companies to remain in South Africa. As such,
it did not pre-emptively conflict with the Ordinance on that basis
either.57
E. Infringement of Federal Foreign Policy Powers
The court then addressed the question of whether the Ordi-
nance impinged on the federal government's authority to decide
and implement foreign policy.58 Of particular concern to the court
was the Supreme Court's decision in Zschernig v. Miller,59 in which
49. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 113-14, 562 A.2d at 740 (citing Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986), for all three propositions).
50. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151, 2346d, 5001-5116 (Supp. V 1987).
51. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 116, 562 A.2d at 741.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 113-18, 562 A.2d at 740-42.
54. Id. at 116-20, 562 A.2d 741-43.
55. Id. at 120, 562 A.2d at 743.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 120-21; 562 A.2d at 743-44.
58. Id. at 121, 562 A.2d at 744.
59. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
1036 [VOL. 49:1030
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the Court held that an Oregon statute unconstitutionally affected
international relations because it required "minute inquiries con-
cerning the actual administration of foreign law."'  The court, how-
ever, decided that under certain circumstances, Zschernig does not
eliminate a state's ability to take "actions involving substantive judg-
ments about foreign nations."61 Here, because the Ordinance was
"a single, general decision" by the City, the court concluded that it
was "beyond the scope of Zschernig."62 In any event, the court deter-
mined that whatever impact the Ordinance had on South Africa was
incidental and minimal.6" The court also distinguished two state
cases 64 and one federal case65 on which the Trustees relied for the
proposition that the Ordinance was an unconstitutional exercise of
foreign policy power.'
F. Commerce Clause Challenges
Lastly, the court focused on the Trustees' claim that the Ordi-
nance violated the implied limitations on state power which flow
from the "dormant" commerce clause-that is, even though Con-
gress has not enacted legislation which governs this issue and its
commerce power thus lies dormant, the State transcended implied
boundaries because the Ordinance unduly burdened interstate com-
merce and attempted to regulate foreign commerce.67 Accepting
this premise, the court turned its attention to the City's defense and
the Trustees' rebuttal." The City argued that as an investor in the
60. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 124-25, 562 A.2d at 745 (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S.
at 435).
61. Id at 126, 562 A.2d at 746.
62. Id (quoting on both occasions from Troyer, Slocombe & Boisture, Divestment of
South Africa Investments: The Legal Implications for Foundations, Other Charitable Institutions,
and Pension Funds, 74 GEO. LJ. 127, 159 (1985)).
63. Id at 127, 562 A.2d at 747.
64. The state cases were Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v.Johnson, 115 Ill. 2d
221, 232, 503 N.E.2d 300, 305 (1986) (holding that because a statute which denied a tax
exemption on South African coins was motivated solely by disapproval of South Africa's
policies, the statute encroached on federal authority over foreign affairs) and New York
Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 345, 352, 361
N.E.2d 963, 968, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317 (1977) (holding that because an agency was
powerless to set and implement foreign policy, the newspaper did not violate an antidis-
crimination law forbidding the advertisement ofjob opportunities in South Africa when
it did so advertise).
65. Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1376-77 (D.N.M. 1980)
(holding unconstitutional a school regents' political decision to deny admission to Ira-
nian students in light of a State Department warning against such actions).
66. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 127-31, 562 A.2d at 747-50.
67. Id. at 131, 562 A.2d at 749.
68. Id.
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pension plans, it was acting as a market participant and therefore
the Ordinance was not a regulation.69 The Trustees countered that:
(1) the City was not a market participant, but rather a governmental
actor, and (2) that the market participant doctrine is available as a
defense only when interstate, and not foreign, commerce is at
issue.7o
The Trustees first posited that the Supreme Court and the
Maryland Court of Appeals have applied the market participant doc-
trine only when states (or counties) bought, sold, or invested to ad-
vance their citizens' economic interests at the expense of another
region's citizens. 7' The court, however, reasoned that the Supreme
Court's choice of language suggests a broader application for the
doctrine,72 and found it illogical that the defense would be available
when overt discrimination took place but unavailable in the absence
of favoritism toward the citizens of a given region. 73 The court then
distinguished the two cases that the Trustees relied upon 74 and in-
stead followed White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employ-
ers,75 in which the Court endorsed Boston's use of economic
leverage over contractors to insure that they employed a certain per-
centage of local workers.76 The Court of Appeals found that situa-
tion similar to Board of Trustees in that both cases involved " 'an
ongoing commercial relationship in which the city retained a contin-
69. Id. at 131-32, 562 A.2d at 749; see, e.g., Reeves Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438-39
(1980) (distinction between regulator and market participant was found in considera-
tions of (1) state sovereignty, (2) the state's role as guardian and trustee of its people,
and (3) the traditional right of actors engaged in private business to exercise discretion
regarding with whom to deal); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810
(1976) (in considering the terms of a Maryland subsidy that disfavored out-of-state busi-
nesses, the Court held that the commerce clause did not forbid a state participating in
the market to favor its own citizens).
70. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 131-32, 562 A.2d at 749.
71. Id. at 133, 562 A.2d at 749-50.
72. Id. at 134, 562 A.2d at 750 (citing Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438-39).
73. Id. at 134-35, 562 A.2d at 750.
74. The Trustees cited Wisconsin Dep't of Indus. v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282, 289 (1986)
(finding that the act of prohibiting state purchases from labor law violators did not give
the state market participant status) and South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke,
467 U.S. 82, 97-98 (1984) (finding that a state requirement, which mandated that timber
purchasers from outside the State process the timber inside the State, could not be de-
fended on market participant grounds because the State burdened a market other than
that in which it participated). The Court of Appeals thought the Trustees' reliance on
Gould was misplaced because the Supreme Court struck down the Wisconsin regulation
on grounds of pre-emption and because the Court held that the market participant doc-
trine was inapplicable when pre-emption existed. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 136, 562
A.2d at 751.
75. 460 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1983).
76. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 136-37, 562 A.2d at 751-52.
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uing proprietary interest' " in the subject." The court noted that
the Supreme Court distinguished its acceptance of the market par-
ticipant doctrine in White from its rejection of that doctrine in South-
Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,78 on the basis that the
latter case involved the regulation of commercial activity for some
time after the State had completed its transaction.
7 9
The court also rejected the Trustees' second argument-that
the market participant doctrine is not available as a defense when
the State burdens foreign, as opposed to interstate, commerce."0 In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on decisions by the
Supreme Courts of New Jersey8 ' and South Carolina, 2 an opinion
of the Attorney General of Maryland," and on a treatise written by
Harvard's Professor Lawrence Tribe."
As a final measure, the court also considered whether the Ordi-
nance violates the commerce clause absent the market participant
defense.8 5 Applying the balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc. ,86 it determined that the burden imposed on interstate
commerce by requiring the sale of "hundreds of millions of dollars"
of investments8 7 was not excessive in relation to the legitimate, local
public interests the City had in divesting. 8
Further, the court decided that a divestment plan designed to
77. Id. at 137, 562 A.2d at 752.
78. 467 U.S. at 97, 99.
79. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 137, 562 A.2d at 751-52.
80. Id. at 138, 562 A.2d at 752.
81. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 75
NJ. 272, 299-300, 381 A.2d 774, 788 (1977) (no need to differentiate between foreign
and interstate commerce in a case in which the constitutionality of a "Buy American"
statute was challenged under the commerce clause).
82. Carll v. S.C. Jobs-Economic Dev. Auth., 284 S.C. 438, 448-49, 327 S.E.2d 331,
337 (1985) (State has the right to set guidelines for its market participation regardless of
effects in either interstate or foreign commerce).
83. 69 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 87, 88-89 (1984) (in considering a similar state proscrip-
tion, Maryland's Attorney General opined that the market participant doctrine applies
when foreign commerce is involved even when restrictions are imposed. on private banks
as a condition of receiving state deposits).
84. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrtrONAL LAw § 6-21, at 469 (2d ed. 1988) (state
laws similar to Baltimore City's Ordinance No. 765 are constitutional under the market
participant doctrine).
85. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 141, 562 A.2d at 753.
86. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). To determine the validity of a state statute that affects
interstate commerce, the Court balanced the legitimate local public interest and its inci-
dental effects on interstate commerce against the burden imposed on such commerce.
Id. at 142.
87. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 143, 562 A.2d at 755.
88. Id. at 144, 562 A.2d at 755.
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promote adherence to the Sullivan Principles, 9 instead of the dis-
continuation of business activities in or with South Africa, would be
ineffective because such a plan would not constitute a less intrusive
way to accomplish the City's purpose.90 Nor did the court accept
the proposition that the Ordinance created a "blockage" of inter-
state commerce by preventing purchases of securities of firms that
did business in South Africa.9'
Lastly, the court concluded that even under the more searching
scrutiny that is called for when foreign commerce is burdened,92 the
Ordinance passes constitutional muster under the commerce
clause.9 3 The court supported this conclusion by noting that the
Ordinance did not violate the foreign commerce clause because it
did not violate a federal directive or implicate a foreign policy deci-
sion which must be left exclusively to the federal government. 4
Moreover, the court determined that the likelihood that South Af-
rica would retaliate and thereby injure innocent states or localities
was remote.95
IIl. ANALYSIS
In upholding the Ordinance, the court rejected the six constitu-
tional arguments posited by the Trustees.96 Many commentators
have advocated striking down divestiture initiatives on grounds that
the Court of Appeals repudiated. 7 Of the six grounds raised, two
89. The Sullivan Principles are a code of fair employment practices created by the
Rev. Leon Sullivan and directed at American companies that do business in South Af-
rica. See id. at 82 n.6, 562 A.2d at 724 n.6; Lewis, supra note 4, at 472 n.18.
90. Board of Trutees, 317 Md. at 143-44, 562 A.2d at 755.
91. Id. at 144-45, 562 A.2d at 755; see Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117, 127 (1978) ("[i]nterstate commerce is not subjected to an impermissible bur-
den simply because an otherwise valid regulation causes some business to shift from one
interstate supplier to another"), aff'g Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md.
410, 370 A.2d 1102 (1977).
92. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 145, 562 A.2d at 756 (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979).
93. Id. at 146, 562 A.2d at 756-57.
94. Id. at 145-47, 562 A.2d at 756-57; see Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 159, 194 (1983) (state legislation violates the foreign commerce clause if it "either
implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the Federal Government or violates
a clear federal directive.").
95. Board of Truhstees, 317 Md. at 147, 562 A.2d at 756-57.
96. Commentators have condemned the wholesale use of constitutional arguments
to attack similar legislation. See, e.g., Troyer, Slocombe & Boisture, supra note 62, at 158
n.1l.
97. Numerous commentators projected a different result. They relied on grounds
almost as numerous as those that the court rejected in Board of Trustees. See Retirement
System: Investment Policies, 87 Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. 84 (May 5, 1987); Lewis, supra note 4,
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seem particularly compelling: Namely, that the Ordinance improp-
erly delegated legislative power to the Africa Fund, and that the Or-
dinance intruded upon the federal government's primacy in foreign
affairs.
A. The Delegation Issue
The Ordinance only narrowly survived the court's scrutiny of
the City's delegation to a private entity of the power to define per-
missible investment opportunities. 98 The court's decision to uphold
the Ordinance hinged on the conclusion that the Trustees are not
"bound"" by the determinations of the Africa Fund. It stands to
reason, however, that the court also should have inquired into how
the Africa Fund compiles and annotates the Unified List and, finally,
into how the Trustees employ it.1°°
By failing to inquire into the nexus between the Unified List's
recommendations and the Trustees' investment decisions, the court
undermined its analysis. Having stated that a binding list would
raise serious constitutional problems, it circumvented the issue by
at 482-87 (the market participant doctrine should not be applied blindly in a foreign
commerce context); McArdle, In Defense of State and Local Government Anti-Apartheid Meas-
ures: Infusing Democratic Values Into Foreign Policymaking, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 813, 822-23
(1989) (expressing little hope that state or local divestment action can survive a foreign
affairs challenge); Note, State and Local Anti-South African Action as an Intrusion Upon the
Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 815, 850 (1986) (challenges based
upon foreign affairs powers, the foreign commerce clause, and pre-emption all could
prevail); infra note 105.
98. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 92, 562 A.2d at 730.
99. Id. at 98, 562 A.2d at 732.
100. The Unified List provides a wide array of information. It addresses questions that
relate to the identity of the corporate entity doing business in South Africa, i.e., parent,
subsidiary, affiliate, or licensee of the listed entry. It identifies the nature of the invest-
ment and the product that the corporate entiiy sells in South Africa. It also provides the
number of employees who work in South Africa and quantifies the company's financial
involvement. The Unified List provides sources of information for each entry, including
contrary sources, and short discussions in paragraph form when a simple chart entry
cannot convey information adequately. Nevertheless, the Unified List offers this
disclaimer:
Corporate connections with South Africa and Namibia are constantly in
flux and additional information becomes available almost daily. Thus this list
should be used as a starting point for further investigation. Before taking final
divestment action users of the Unified List should seek confirmation r.e. corporate in-
volvement from the companies themselves, especially where an investment portfolio
held in trust is concerned. The information appearing in the Unified List is de-
rived from a wide variety of sources, including secondary sources. While we
have striven for accuracy, we can not [sic] guarantee the correctness of informa-
tion appearing in the list.
R. KNIGHT & R. WALKE, supra note 26, at ii (emphasis original).
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applying the rule of statutory interpretation which demands that
courts construe legislation so as not to conflict with the Constitu-
tion.S' Instead, the court should have determined whether the Uni-
fied List was in fact used as a nonbinding reference list. It would
have been reasonable for the court to have required the Trustees to
demonstrate that they acted with some degree of independence in
making divestment decisions as evidence of the nonbinding effect of
the Unified List. In practical terms, if such a requirement imposed
high research costs' 0 2 on the pension funds and resulted in dimin-
ished variable returns, then the City could have provided its employ-
ees with optional investment programs that relied upon investor
ratification of such research costs.10 3 An increased demand for less
expensive data also might drive local governments to share the re-
search burden, which eventually could reduce the cost of such
information.
The issue is of great importance because the Africa Fund could
be thrust into a position of great power, depending on the number
of state or local governments that rely upon the Unified List. The
Africa Fund's decisions can indirectly but decisively affect South Af-
rica's population and government, scores of owners and employees
of America's corporations, and millions of pension fund benefi-
ciaries. It is not in the best interest of pension beneficiaries to re-
main wedded to this or any other organization-particularly one
whose principle objective has nothing to do with earning a satisfac-
tory return on their pension dollars. ' °4 The success of the divest-
101. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 97-98, 562 A.2d at 732.
102. See IRRC, supra note 36, at 27.
Active managers who rely on security analysts to investigate the return
prospects of stocks will incur higher research costs under divestment because
they will have to follow a larger number of smaller stocks, which may require
more intensive research where little "street" analysis exists for them.
The extent of the increase in research costs depends in part on the size of
the manager's investment organization and, in part, on the manager's style.
Id
103. See infra notes 174-176 and accompanying text (discussing the proposal of pro-
viding trust beneficiaries with investment options).
104. Langbein and Posner, as well as others noted below, would argue that the court
was wrong to find that the Ordinance does not violate the Trustees' fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care found in §§ 404(a)(1) and 404(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1982), and also found in
the common law. Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L.
REv. 72 (1980); see Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089, 1098-99, 1106, 1113
(D.D.C. 1971) (trustees of union pension fund violated duty of loyalty when they in-
vested not for the purpose of maximizing return, but to provide collateral advantages to
the union). Langbein and Posner also strongly attacked both Professor Scott's endorse-
ment of social investment as inconsistent with his emphasis on loyalty and prudence, see
1042 [VOL. 49:1030
BOARD OF TRUSTEES V. CITY OF BALTIMORE
ment movement already has inspired other activists to use
investment funds to achieve other social ends." 5 Indeed, it seems
clear that investment decisions made with an eye toward social and
political ends are likely to become an increasingly important part of
modem fund management. And if cities choose to become socially
conscious investors, they should do so only if either pension fund
beneficiaries' financial interests remain protected or the benefi-
ciaries are given an investment alternative.
B. The Foreign Affairs Analysis
Although the court's decision that the Ordinance does not un-
constitutionally intrude upon the federal government's authority to
conduct foreign relations ultimately may prove correct, its reason-
ing is flawed in more than one respect. First, the court mistakenly
discounted the impact that local divestment legislation has had on
South Africa. It also disregarded that the Ordinance is designed to
do more than absolve the City of its guilt for perpetuating apartheid
through its investments: it is, in part, a coercive measure designed
to promote change in South Africa.'1 6 Finally, the court failed in its
attempt to distinguish Board of Trustees from Zschernig v. Miller.10 7
The Court of Appeals' unwillingness to acknowledge all of the
Ordinance's underlying purposes hurts the decision's credibility.
The court stated that the Ordinance simply ensures that the pension
supra note 43 and accompanying text, and Ravikoff and Curzan's contention that "the
law of trusts is in flux and is hence no obstacle to their policy preferences." Langbein &
Posner, supra, at 100-04. See Ravikoff& Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and
the Prudent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518 (1980). See also Hutchinson & Cole, Legal
Standards Governing Investment of Pension Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 1340, 1384-85 (1980) (casting doubt on the acceptability of either exclusionary or
inclusionary social investment programs under ERISA); Lanoff, The Social Investment of
Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done Lawfully Under ERISA?, 31 LAB. LJ. 387, 390-92
(1980) (stating that the Department of Labor will disapprove of pension funds which
engage in social investing based upon a policy of exclusion). But see Dobris, Arguments in
Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of "South African" Securities, 65 NEB. L. REV. 209, 241 (1986)
(concluding that morality suggests subordinating the law of trusts to the need for pro-
moting change in South Africa); Comment, The South African Divestment Debate: Factoring
"Political Risk" into the Prudent Investor Rule, 55 CINN. L. REV. 201, 213-15 (1986) (sug-
gesting that a divestment rationale based upon political risk in South Africa should over-
come allegations of a breach of the prudent man rule).
105. See Mufson, Taking Stock Of S. Africa Achievement, Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1990, at HI,
col. 1.
106. SeeJ. HANLON & R. OMOND, THE SANCTIONS HANDBOOK (1987). The strategy is to
place pressure on companies, who by their withdrawal from South Africa, injure the
South African economy and place pressure on its government. Thus, the coercive pro-
cess involves two distinct steps. Id. at 9, 28-29, 31, 201-03, 284-85, 287-88, 335, 337.
107. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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funds will "not be invested in a manner that [is] morally offensive to
many Baltimore residents and many beneficiaries of the pension
funds."' l 8 Unfortunately, however, it is implausible to suggest that
the majority of City employees are cognizant of where and how their
pension funds are invested. To the extent that they are concerned,
it is much more likely that they care about the financial performance
of their pension funds.
Even assuming that the beneficiaries care deeply about the so-
cial impact of their investments, the court should have confronted
the fact that a more important rationale lay behind the Ordinance
than simply the beneficiaries' moral absolution.'0 9 While the text of
the Ordinance does not explain fully why the City chose to divest," 0
it is clear that divestiture is a national movement, and that much can
be learned about the Ordinance by comparing it to similar legisla-
tion."' Indeed, in the minds of some commentators, promoting
governmental change in South Africa is the most important goal of
divestment." 2  Measured against this objective, divestment has
achieved considerable success. Although the ultimate social goal of
dismantling the apartheid system has not yet been achieved, 1 1 the
108. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 127, 562 A.2d at 746.
109. In its rejection of the foreign affairs challenge, the court stated that "Baltimore
City's purpose in enacting the Ordinances was simply to ensure that the City's pension
funds would not be invested in a manner that was morally offensive to many Baltimore
residents and many beneficiaries of the pension funds." Id. But this statement takes
such a restricted view of the purposes of divestment that it could not escape contradic-
tion elsewhere in the opinion. As the court discussed the definition of "doing business"
in or with South Africa, it remarked that "[c]learly, however, the City Council did not
contemplate a definition so narrow as to frustrate the objectives of divestiture." Id. at
98, 562 A.2d at 732-33. "[O]bjectives" is in the plural form. The implication, of course,
is that some objective exists beyond merely avoiding the moral taint of having invested
indirectly in South Africa.
110. The preamble of the Ordinance simply states: "FOR the purpose of ending the
investment of public pension funds in firms doing business in or with South Africa AND
NAMIBIA." Baltimore, Md., Ordinance 765 (July 3, 1986).
111. See Prince George's County, Md., Res. CR-190-1985 (Nov. 19, 1985) (citing simi-
lar divestment action in other jurisdictions); Note, supra note 98, at 817-18 n.28 (citing
numerous efforts of divestment activists to coordinate). The Zschernig Court took a simi-
lar approach to discovering the purpose behind the Oregon courts' interpretations of
the State's probate reciprocity provision. It provided numerous examples of explana-
tory dicta in other jurisdictions and extrapolated the "real desiderata" behind the deci-
sions it cited. 389 U.S. 429, 437 n.8 (1968).
112. See Dobris, supra note 105, at 212-14 (divestment brings the potential for change
through evolution or revolution); B. BALDWIN & T. BROWN, ECONOMIC ACTION AGAINST
APARTHEID: AN OVERVIEW OF THE DIVESTMENT CAMPAIGN AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 1-9 (1985) (discussing economic impact of divestment on
South Africa); Note, supra note 98, at 822 (divestment may hasten demise of apartheid
through economic pressure).
113. At the time of this Note, the South African government recently had released
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United States as a whole has applied substantial economic pressure
against South Africa. 1 4 The campaign has led to the loss of billions
of dollars of new United States investments" 5 and to a serious de-
cline in existing United States investments in South Africa. t6 Eco-
nomically, the cessation of new foreign investments will have long
term impacts that will result in a decline in South African growth." 7
Of course, these impacts on South Africa and on the United
States' relations with South Africa are not the product of Balti-
more's Ordinance alone. It took the concerted effort of many states,
cities, and companies to produce statistically significant corporate
withdrawals." 8 The trend of divestment legislation has been perva-
sive and has had an impact approaching that of a national policy.
The Court of Appeals ignored this fact and instead accepted the cir-
cuit court's premise that the Ordinance had only "minimal" ef-
fect." 9  Characterizing the Ordinance as ineffective and
inconsequential does not do it justice. Given the divestment move-
ment's nationwide appeal in the United States and its impact in
South Africa, 2 ' this finding is disingenuous. It is worth remember-
from prison Nelson Mandela, the pre-eminent black South African leader, after it had
incarcerated him for 27 years. See Ottaway, S. Africa to Free Mandela from Prison Today,
Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1990, at A1, col. 4. As encouraging as this news may have been, it
was not clear that the country would dismande the apartheid system in the near future.
114. See B. BALDWIN & T. BROWN, supra note 113, at 1-9 (reporting some of the pres-
sure applied against South Africa); J. HANLON & R. OMOND, supra note 107, at 336 (not-
ing that 200 corporations have disposed of their equity investments; 90 have withdrawn
equity investments, including IBM, GM, GE, and Coca-Cola; and a handful have at-
tempted total withdrawals, including Eastman Kodak, AT&T, and CBS); Mufson, supra
note 106, at Hl, col. 1 (divestment has not only contributed to change in South Africa,
but also has led to other social investment efforts because of its success).
115. B. BALDWIN & T. BROWN, supra note 113, at 2 (quoting a registered foreign agent
of South Africa in the United States as saying in early 1985 that "[uin one respect at
least, the divestment forces have already won. They have prevented---discouraged, dis-
suaded, whatever you call it- billions of dollars of new U.S. investments in South
Africa.").
116. See Note, supra note 98, at 825-26 (United States investments dropped from $2.6
billion in 1982 to $1.8 billion in 1984).
117. H. A. KHAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID 66, 69-
71 (1989).
118. See supra note 4 (by September 1986, scores of cities and counties had passed
divestment laws).
119. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 127, 516 A.2d at 746-47 (citing Clark v. Allen, 331
U.S. 503, 517 (1947) for the proposition that a local law is valid as long as its impact on
foreign countries is only incidental or indirect). The court further discounted the effect
of the Ordinance by noting that it would have no immediate effect on foreign relations
and that it would only affect companies that did a significant amount of business in
South Africa. In addition, divestment would occur gradually and would not cause polit-
ical instability by itself. Id., 562 A.2d at 747.
120. See supra note 115.
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ing that in Zschernig, the Court was concerned with the impact of one
state's regulation on foreign relations: "The present Oregon [pro-
bate] law is not as gross an intrusion in the federal domain as those
others might be. Yet, as we have said, it has a direct impact upon
foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the cen-
tral government to deal with those problems."' 2' The Court distin-
.guished Zschernig from its lineal predecessor Clark v. Allen,'
22
primarily because Zschernig had more than "some incidental or indi-
rect effect in foreign countries." 123 The Court hesitated to catego-
rize the Oregon statute as mere "diplomatic bagatelle."'
21
Concededly, the impacts that the Baltimore Ordinance produces are
not "direct" in the purest sense. 125 But the court seemed to place
form before substance when it ignored the fact that the City Council
intended the Ordinance to impact South Africa, whether indirectly
or directly.' 2 6 The Zschernig Court, for example, noted disapprov-
ingly of a California probate statute's reciprocity provision that
"[t]he statute is not an inheritance statute, but a statute of confisca-
tion and retaliation."'' 27 Any acknowledgement of the antagonistic
character of the local divestment statutes would have led inevitably
to the conclusion that they are more closely akin to the statute in
Zschernig than to the less intrusive legislation upheld in Clark.
It is difficult to deny that Baltimore's "voice"-even if indistin-
guishable from that of other states and localities-was heard. It is
even more difficult to deny that divestiture late in the Reagan ad-
ministration had the effect of splitting the United States' voice in
international affairs. Indeed, President Reagan and his spokesper-
sons never agreed with Congress and the public that either sanc-
tions or divestment were the appropriate response to apartheid.
2 8
121. 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968); see McArdle, supra note 98, at 820-21 (the Court
framed the relevant inquiry in Zschernig as one of "direct impact," yet did not detail any
need to show measurable effects on an articulated national policy).
122. 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (general reciprocity clause on its face does not intrude on
the federal foreign powers).
123. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35.
124. Id at 435,
125. See id. at 434-35, 441 (establishing a direct impact standard). The Court of Ap-
peals argued that the impact on foreign relations is "incidental or indirect" and there-
fore does not cross the line which forbids states to make foreign policy. Board of Trustees,
317 Md. at 127, 562 A.2d at 746 (citing Clark, 331 U.S. at 517).
126. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 106, 562 A.2d at 737.
127. 389 U.S. at 434 (citing In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 161 P.2d 589, 593 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1945), superceded by 31 Cal. 2d 580, 191 P.2d 752 (1948)).
128. See Note, supra note 98, at 829-31 (citing President Reagan's remarks as he
signed his executive order of September 9, 1985, which imposed more moderate sanc-
tions on South Africa than Congress would have imposed; Reagan said that the sanc-
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Although the court correctly noted that the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 198629 did not pre-empt the Ordinance because
the City and congressional policies were not in conflict, the Ordi-
nance did conflict with the broad goals of the President's policy of
constructive engagement.' 30 In effect, the United States articulated
foreign policy in three voices: those of the Administration, the Con-
gress, and the local governmental entities.
The court's distinction of Zschernig was not persuasive. It
adopted the trial court's interpretation of Zschernig as forbidding
only "continuing investigation, assessment or commentary by local
government officials or employees into the laws or operations of the
South African government."131 But Zschernig purports to limit states
and localities far more than the circuit court admitted.' 3 2 Zschemig
disapproves of "minute inquiries" into the administration of law,13 3
and of local laws that affect international relations "in a subtle and
persistent way."' 3 4 The Baltimore Ordinance arguably crosses both
of these lines.' 35 Moreover, lest it be argued that Zschernig back-
handedly condones regulations that do not "impair the effective ex-
ercise of the Nation's foreign policy,"' 3 the probate reciprocity
statute at issue in Zschernig was entirely consistent with the generally
antagonistic policies the United States pursued towards the commu-
nist block during the Cold War. Nor can the Ordinance's support-
ers reasonably argue that the position of the Zschernig Court rested
on antipathy towards local judicial actions as opposed to legislative
tions were not designed to result in the withdrawal of U.S. investments in South Africa),
infra note 158.
129. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151, 2346(d), 5001-5116 (Supp. V 1987).
130. See supra note 4.
131. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 126, 562 A.2d at 746 (quoting from Board of Trust-
ees of the Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. 863665065/CE-59858
(Baltimore City Cir., July 17, 1987)).
132. See McArdle, supra note 98, at 822-23 (given Zschernigs low threshold for direct
impact and a lack of criteria for identifying impact, the case leaves little hope for state or
local actions attacked under the foreign affairs clauses); see also Note, North Carolina's
South African Divestment Statute, 67 N.C.L. REV. 949, 966-67 (1989) (presenting arguments
that the Zschernig case established a per se rule).
133. 389 U.S. 429, 435 (1968); see Note, The Constitutionality of State and Local Govern-
ments' Response to Apartheid- Divestment Legislation, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 763, 781-83
(1985) (focusing on Zschernig's direct impact test and its disapproval of inquiries into
actual administration of foreign laws).
134. 389 U.S. at 440.
135. But see Note, supra note 133, at 974 (developing a balancing test and concluding
that North Carolina's divestment statute which requires corporations to adhere to the
Sullivan Principles is constitutional).
136. 389 U.S. at 440.
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acts.' 3 7 The mere fact that the Ordinance represents a "single gen-
eral decision," 3 8 seems insufficient to justify distinguishing Board of
Trustees from Zschernig-the Ordinance very likely would have a more
lasting impact on relations with South Africa than a single judicial
decision. In summary, it appears that the court ought to have found
a sturdier basis for its decision to reject the foreign powers
challenge.
C. The First Amendment Issue
In an article13 9 responsive to the initial circuit court decision 40
that led to Board of Trustees, Professor Andrea L. McArdle suggests
that the first amendment right of free speech shields subnational
governments' decisions to divest.' 41  McArdle recognizes that di-
vestment legislation is more than an economic lever or means by
which a community can absolve itself of moral liability for apartheid.
Such legislation also serves as an expression of community senti-
ment deserving of first amendment protection. 42 Although no
other commentator has raised this argument, intuitively it seems
clear that divestment legislation, like many boycotts, has expressive
as well as coercive aims. As such, McArdle focuses not on whether
the first amendment protects state and local governments, 43 but on
137. See Lewis, supra note 4, at 514. The Zschernig Court struck down the legislation as
well as the Oregon judicial decisions that had denied East German nationals their inheri-
tance. 389 U.S. at 440.
138. Board of Trustees, 317 Md. at 126, 562 A.2d at 746 (quoting Troyer, Slocombe &
Boisture, supra note 62, at 159).
139. McArdle, supra note 98, at 813, 833.
140. Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. 863665065/CE-59898 (Baltimore
City Cir. July 17, 1989).
141. McArdle, supra note 98, at 832.
142. Id. at 833.
143. McArdle argues that regardless of whether subnational governments are entitled
to first amendment protections, they possess political rights inherent to the federal sys-
tem which permit them to engage in political bargaining and coalition-building. McAr-
die, supra note 98, at 834. Most notably, these rights are exercised in the United States
Senate, in which states are represented in the national government and are collectively
given the foreign affairs power to ratify treaties. Id. at 835. McArdle also refers to L.
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CoNsTrrroN 476 n.51 (1972), for the proposition
that the existence of specific constitutional prohibitions of state action with respect to
foreign affairs may imply that other activities are permissible. Id. at 822 n.67. But see
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (interest of subnational governments re-
quires that they not infringe upon federal power over foreign relations); United States v.
Belmont, 310 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (the state as an entity does not exist for purposes of
foreign relations). Moreover, although the structure of the federal government allows
states a voice in the Senate, that structure also suggests that the Senate is the only ap-
propriate forum in which states may express themselves by approving a foreign policy.
The mere fact that states are represented in the Senate does not imply that they should
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the expressive nature of divestment initiatives. 144
[L]ocal government expression that relates to public affairs
promotes a societal interest in the free flow of information
pertaining to government. By its nature, such expression
implicates first amendment values and merits protection,
even if the vehicle for this speech, the local government
entity or its policymaking organ, does not.1 45
Noting that conduct mixed with speech may be regulated more
closely than pure speech, Professor McArdle identifies the "speech
plus" situation as the potential Achilles' heel of the first amendment
defense for divestment. 146 The Supreme Court in United States v.
O'Brien 147 set forth the test that courts are to apply when a plaintiff
wants to prevent the government from regulating conduct that has
both speech and non-speech elements. 48 The test asks the court to
identify whether the government's interest in regulating the non-
speech aspect of the individual's conduct is sufficiently important to
justify the incidental constraints that such regulation places upon
the communicative aspects of the conduct. 49 As such, O'Brien's
conviction was based on the non-speech element of burning his
draft card, not on the communicative component of that conduct.' 50
In O'Brien, the Court found that the governmental interest in ensur-
ing the smooth operation of the Selective Service System out-
weighed any first amendment limitations.' 5 ' In applying the O'Brien
test to divestment legislation, McArdle explains that challengers of
divestment complain primarily that the federal government, and not
subnational entities, must be the unique source of our country's
voice in international affairs.' 5 2 She views the expressive compo-
nent of divestment legislation as the only constitutional culprit
feel free to disregard treaties which are repugnant to them, but which the Senate never-
theless ratified. Of course, if McArdle is correct that first amendment protection de-
pends not upon the speaker's identity but upon the nature of the communication, then
this debate may not be decisive.
144. McArdle, supra note 98, at 836. McArdle quotes from First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978), that speech should be
evaluated, "in terms of its capacity for informing the public [which] does not depend
upon the identity of its source."
145. McArdle, supra note 98, at 837.
146. Id. at 841.
147. 391 U.S. 367 (rejecting first amendment challenge to conviction for burning
draft card), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968).
148. Id. at 377.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 382.
151. Id.
152. McArdle, supra note 98, at 842; see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229, 233-
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under a foreign affairs challenge.' 5 - Under the O'Brien test, McAr-
die posits that the strength of the first amendment protections for
the Ordinance are at their maximum because expression, not con-
duct, is being attacked.
In the next step of the decision-making process-the actual bal-
ancing of the right of free speech against the integrity of the federal
government's foreign affairs powers-McArdle argues that the for-
mer generally will prevail.'54 Although the Supreme Court has ab-
jured an explicit balancing of first amendment and foreign powers
interests,' 55 the Court's practice of according great weight to
speech, and permitting only a greater constitutional interest to off-
set it, effectively constitutes a balancing test "heavily skewed" in
favor of the first amendment values.' 56 Thus, McArdle's analytical
framework leaves little doubt that divestment legislation should be
upheld.
Professor McArdle's analysis raises two important questions.
The first relates to her perception that because the Ordinance rep-
resents a "voice" in foreign affairs, the foreign affairs challenge ad-
dresses primarily the speech aspects of the Ordinance. In so doing,
McArdle mistakenly disregards the Ordinance's significant coercive
function. The economic impact that divestment has had on South
Africa is analogous to the impact produced by a national economic
policy. Clearly, economic policies may be composed of elements
other than speech. Both the President's 1985 sanctions, 57 and the
34 (1942) (President, without consent of Senate, has power to establish United States
foreign policy; states do not share in power over external affairs).
153. McArdle, supra note 98, at 842.
154. Id. at 838-41.
155. The Court in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) stated:
We recognize that both interests are substantial, but we deem it inappro-
priate for this Court to label one as being more important or more substantial
than the other .... We have ruled only that the Constitution requires that the
conflict between constitutional power and individual rights be accommodated
by legislation drawn more narrowly to avoid such conflict.
Id. at 268 n.20.
156. McArdle, supra note 98, at 839-40 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (prior restraint imposed on the press through an
injunction against publishing the Pentagon Papers was presumed constitutionally invalid
as are all prior restraints; the government thus carries heavy burden of justifying such
prior restraint)).
157. Exec. Order No. 12,532, 3 C.F.R. § 387 (1985). The President derived the pow-
ers to implement the sanctions from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982). The President probably overstepped his au-
thority because the IEEPA supplies the President with supplementary powers only when
an "unusual and extraordinary threat," whose source is outside the United States, arises.
Id. § 1701(a). The President also invoked authority that a number of other enabling
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more sweeping congressional act of 198658 contained both expres-
sive and coercive components. These two components are most
easily distinguishable when a rift arises between them, such as that
which appeared in the President's 1985 sanctions: the economically
coercive aspect of the 1985 sanctions was antithetical to Reagan's
articulation, even as he signed the Executive Order mandating
the sanctions, of the United States policy of constructive
engagement.' 59
Viewed in light of this incongruous Executive Order, the Ordi-
nance's coercive component becomes more evident-even though it
exists in harmony with the expressive component. The problem this
poses for Professor McArdle's emphasis on the expressive element
of divestment is that some harm to South Africa's economy would
occur even if that country somehow failed to receive Baltimore's dis-
approving message. In other words, the coercion might exist even
in the absence of the expression. As a result, under O'Brien, the first
amendment power to protect divestment would not be at its apogee,
as she suggests. Whether it is still strong enough to counterbalance
a foreign powers challenge remains to be seen.
The second problem, which McArdle herself noted,"6 is that
the minority's expressions are likely to be squelched in a community
that chooses to express itself through its political organs. She ar-
gues, though, that the "public scrutiny and discussion," which gen-
erally will arise in a local legislative body, constitutes a "reasonable
accommodation" to the minority.' 6 ' Her counterargument unfortu-
nately ignores the existence of an even more glaring problem.
Beyond merely deterring minority speech, using government as
a vehicle for expression co-opts minority voices by adding them to
those of the majority. For example, those who support a policy of
constructive engagement may prefer to see their pension funds in-
vested in companies that do business in South Africa. The passage
of the Ordinance, however, forced them to join in the symbolic and
coercive act of divesting and infringed on their first amendment
rights to refrain from speaking.' 62
laws granted to him. See Lewis, supra note 4; supra notes 145-147 and accompanying
text.
158. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151, 2346(d), 5001-5116 (Supp. V. 1987).
159. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
160. McArdle, supra note 98, at 837-38.
161. See id. at 838, notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (com-
pelled speech and compelled silence are constitutionally equivalent); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (no official may prescribe polt-
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Addressing state-mandated symbolic acts, Chief Justice Burger
wrote in Wooley v. Mdynard ' 63 that "[t]he First Amendment protects
the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the
majority and to refuse to foster.., an idea they find morally objec-
tionable."'" The Wooley Court found that the State infringed on
two Jehovah's Witnesses' rights "to refuse to foster" by prosecuting
them for placing tape over the state motto on their license plate.
The majority felt that any difference between mandating display of
the state motto and requiring citizens to make symbolic gestures
such as saluting the flag was merely one of degree.' 65 It then bal-
anced the injury inflicted on the Jehovah's Witnesses against the
State's countervailing interests and found the former to be
weightier.
In Board of Trustees, the City could justify the Ordinance by argu-
ing that it: (1) demonstrates the City's disapproval of apartheid, (2)
relieves the pensioners of moral culpability for sustaining apartheid
with their investments, and (3) contributes to an effort to apply eco-
nomic pressure indirectly against South Africa for the reform of
apartheid. Whether or not these rationales are more weighty than
those proffered in Wooley 166 may make little difference: The Wooley
Court emphatically stated that "where the State's interest is to dis-
seminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such inter-
est cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid
becoming the courier for such message."' 67
Similarly, focusing on second party attempts to require political
conduct, courts have condemned the imposition of compulsory
union fees designated for political purposes that fee-paying nonun-
ion members found objectionable. 68 In Abood v. Detroit Board of Ed-
ical orthodoxy or force citizens to act to show conformance with it); Russo v. Central
School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 634 (2d Cir.) (first amendment protects the right to remain
silent in the face of an illegitimate demand for speech), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1972).
163. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
164. Id. at 715.
165. Id. See generally Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624; Russo, 469 F.2d at 623 (both involved
the right not to salute the flag).
166. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). The State argued that the motto (1) facilitated the identifi-
cation of passenger cars because commercial vehicles' tags did not bear a motto, and (2)
promoted an appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride. The Court rejected
the first rationale because other features distinguished passenger and commercial vehi-
cles. The second fell because it was not an ideologically neutral rationale. Instead, it
was an official view whose transmission was less important than an individual's right to
refuse to be a proponent of the view. Id. at 716-17.
167. Id at 717.
168. See Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1986)
(union acting as agent for nonmembers must establish procedures that protect non-
1052 [VOL. 49:1030
BOARD OF TRUSTEES V. CITY OF BALTIMORE
ucation,' 69 the Court held unconstitutional the use of such fees for
political activities that certain employees objected to and that were
not related to the collective bargaining process. °7 0 As such, the
Court ruled that if the union wished to make political contributions,
it would be required to finance such activities with contributions
made by employees who did not object to the contributions and who
were not coerced into making them.' 7' If the Abood rule applies to
politically motivated public divestment in addition to political con-
tributions, then an analogous accommodation by the City to dissent-
ers would lay this and other problems to rest. 172
CONCLUSION
This Note concludes that the reasoning which the Court of Ap-
peals used to uphold the Baltimore divestment ordinance was
flawed in two areas. First, the court should have required the circuit
court to determine, as a matter of fact, whether the City had dele-
gated authority to the Africa Fund. The Unified List provides the
Trustees with enough data to allow them to make discretionary deci-
sions or to steer them in the direction of further research. But to
escape the conclusion that the Trustees' use of the list constituted a
de facto improper delegation of authority, the City should have
been required to show that the Trustees did exercise some discre-
tion and did not rely unthinkingly on the list. Similarly, the trial
court's determination that the Unified List was nonbinding as a mat-
ter of law was reviewable, and the Court of Appeals might have paid
closer attention to conduct of the Board of Trustees which might
evidence its interpretation in fact of the Ordinance.
Second, the court also sidestepped the Trustee's argument that
the City impinged on the federal government's foreign policy pow-
ers. As discussed, the Ordinance has both expressive and coercive
components; and these, together with the divestment legislation of
other subnational entities, have had a notable impact on foreign re-
lations. The court should have explored more carefully than it did
members from having their fees contributed to causes which are objectionable to them);
Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458, 461-62 (D.N.M. 1982) (donation to a lobbying effort of
mandatory dues collected by the state bar association infringed upon members' first
amendment rights).
169. 431 U.S. 209, 234-37 (1977) (compelling nonunion members to make contribu-
tions for political purposes infringes on their first amendment rights just as would
prohibiting contributions).
170. Id. at 235-36.
171. Id.
172. See infra text accompanying notes 174-76 (discussing such an accommodation).
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in Board of Trustees the principle that primacy in foreign relations is
lodged in the federal government.
Finally, Professor McArdle has proposed an argument that bal-
ances the constitutional requirements of the federal structure
against the speech values embodied in the first amendment. The
effectiveness of McArdle's argument, however, is contingent upon
acknowledging only the expressive elements of divestment legisla-
tion and ignoring the coercive elements. The Court of Appeals
adopted a functionally similar view when it found that the Ordi-
nance had minimal economic impact on South Africa, and focused
almost exclusively on the City's desire merely to remove the moral
taint of having supported the system of apartheid through its invest-
ments. Essential to this approach was the court's decision to disas-
sociate the Ordinance from the large, national movement against
apartheid and to treat it as an isolated legislative act. This approach
is disingenuous considering the economic repercussions that divest-
ment has had on South Africa which resulted from the coercive ele-
ment of the legislation.
Simply focusing on the Ordinance's expressive component also
implicates other first amendment concerns that cut against McAr-
dle's view. For example, some employees undoubtedly prefer not to
see their pension funds become vehicles for objectionable symbolic
speech. Even if all of the City's employees agree that apartheid is
the scourge of South Africa, some still may adhere to the belief that
divestment is counter-productive, and that a proactive American
policy is preferable. Local divestment programs arguably force such
people to foster symbolic speech and to join in political conduct that
they find objectionable.
The problems that this Note raises can be resolved by institut-
ing a change in the City's divestment program. A degree of flexibil-
ity should be introduced to counter the problem raised by the
delegation issue (and potential violations of fiduciary duty), the for-
eign affairs challenge, and the minority's first amendment rights.
This could be accomplished by an option under which employees
who object to the divestment program for any reason may opt to
place pension funds in a separate trust fund that does not divest
from South Africa. Relying on the trust law doctrine of ratification,
Professors Langbein and Posner have suggested that divesting pub-
lic pension funds should allow beneficiaries to choose between
traditional plans or divesting plans.17 3 Those who opted for the di-
173. Langbein & Posner, supra note 105, at 105-06. Professors Langbein and Posner
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vesting plan would be estopped from complaining that the divesting
plan's financial performance was inferior to that of the market and
that they were forced to foster speech that they found
objectionable.' 74
In addition to the first amendment and fiduciary duty problems,
this approach would blunt the challenges brought under the
nondelegation doctrine and the federal foreign affairs powers. The
City could argue that it merely was responding to public demands
for pension fund investment options. Private citizens invest their
dollars as they see fit without implicating a challenge to the foreign
affairs powers. Through ratification, the pension fund beneficiaries
can be given the same opportunity to make private investment
choices. The inclusion of a ratification component would transform
the divestment legislation from a local government policy into an
opportunity for individual citizens to accomplish the same result
through private initiatives. This logic also deflects charges of im-
proper delegation: the beneficiaries, and not the City, are the par-
ties who confer authority on the Trustees to divest the funds.' 75 Of
course, if the Trustees rely too heavily on the Unified List, they may
have to answer the beneficiaries' breach of fiduciary duty claims.
But no delegation problem arises because the Trustees' power to
divest derives from a private source, not the legislature. By adopt-
ing such a change, the City could realize a divestment strategy as
principled as the ideals it advances.
GARRETT M. SMrrH
addressed the possibility that a social investment policy such as that which the Trustees
opposed would violate the common and statutory law of trusts. In outlining their pro-
posal, they felt that the voluntaristic approach would be acceptable when variable bene-
fits were at issue. But if fixed benefits were concerned, the City would be liable to its
employees to make up any shortfall in their benefits, regardless of whether the employ-
ees opted for a divestment strategy. IM at 106.
174. Id. at 106.
175. Id. at 105-06. This argument is premised, as is Langbein and Posner's argument,
on the understanding that employee contributions to the pension funds are required,
and the employees are therefore settlors of the funds. Id. at 105.
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